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Abstract
This thesis displays that the seminal results of Maskin (1999) on Nash
implementation are continuous with respect to a specific measure when atten-
tion is restricted to the domain of preferences representable by cardinal utility
functions. Our continuity measure is associated with three modified com-
ponents of Maskin’s results: epsilon-implementability, epsilon-monotonicity
and epsilon-no veto power. Employing cardinal utility functions, we define
epsilon-neighborhoods around Maskin’s standard components and show that
his results continue to hold with this epsilon-approximation.
Keywords: Nash implementation, epsilon-equilibrium, Maskin mono-
tonicity.
MASKI˙N’I˙N UYGULAMA SONUCUNUN SU¨REKLI˙LI˙G˜I˙ U¨ZERI˙NE
Nuh Aygu¨n DALKIRAN
Ekonomi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2006
Tez Dans¸manı: Mehmet BARLO
O¨zet
Bu tezde, Maskin’in Nash uygulaması ic¸in buldug˜u temel sonucların su¨reklilig˜i
incelenmektedir. Bunun ic¸in kullandıg˜ımız su¨reklilik o¨lc¸u¨su¨ Maskin (1999)’in
sonuc¸larının kaynag˜ı olan u¨c¸ temel unsurun uygun s¸ekilde deg˜is¸tirilmesi ile
elde edilmis¸ u¨c¸ yeni nosyona dayanmaktadır. Bu u¨c¸ yeni unsur sırasıyla:
epsilon-dengesi, epsilon-monotonisite ve epsilon-veto hakkı olmamasıdır. Bu
unsurlar standard unsurların epsilon koms¸uluklarıdır. Buldug˜umuz sonuc¸
go¨stermektedir ki kardinal fayda fonksiyonları kullanıldıg˜ında Maskin’in sonucu
bu epsilon yaklas¸ım ic¸in de gec¸erli olmaktadır.
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A society is a group of individuals distinguishable from other groups by mu-
tual interests, characteristic relationships, shared institutions, and a common
culture. Here what is meant by a society is merely a collection of individuals
with certain characteristics. We often refer to these individuals as agents of
the society. A society faces many economic, social, and political situations
where individuals must interact to make decisions that may affect them col-
lectively. Voting to elect representatives, choosing a public policy, as well as
production and allocation of private and/or public goods are some common
examples. These kind of situations in which a society has to decide among
the available alternatives are known as social decision problems.
We will assume that the objectives of a society are represented by a social
choice rule depending on the social decision problem and the characteristics
of the society. A social choice rule can be regarded as a rule agreed by the
members of the society or designed by a social planner according to some
normative characteristics; and it selects a feasible set of alternatives among
1
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all alternatives available to the society depending on the characteristics of
the society. One can regard the social choice rule as the set of socially
optimal alternatives. Examples range from the Pareto rule which selects
Pareto optimal alternatives, to the Walrasian rule which is a social choice
rule selecting the competitive equilibrium allocations.
If the relevant characteristics of the society are publicly known, then social
choice rule outcomes can be obtained easily. The problem of implementa-
tion arises because the true preference profile of the society is generally not
common knowledge. Hence, a social planner may have to elicit preferences
of individuals in the society. However, there is then the problem of misrep-
resentation of preferences. Depending on the preference profile of the society
and the social choice rule, individuals may act strategically to influence the
outcome of a social decision problem to their advantage. Hence, the design of
the institution through which individuals of a society interact has a profound
effect on the strategic behavior of the individuals of that society.
A social choice rule is said to be implementable if a mechanism exists
so that the equilibrium of this mechanism and the socially optimal alterna-
tives indicated by the social choice rule coincide. To be more precise, given
a normative goal characterized by a social choice rule, implementation the-
ory deals with the characterization of mechanisms that will create outcomes
consistent with the given normative goal hence with the social choice rule.1
Obviously, game theory plays a central role in implementation theory,
1More information on implementation theory can be found in the following surveys;
Allen (1997), Corcho´n (1996), Groves and Ledyard (1987), Jackson (2001), Maskin (1985),
Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), Moore (1992), Moulin (1982), Palfrey (1992), Palfrey (2001),
Palfrey and Srivastava (1993), and Postlewaite (1985)
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since an institution is modeled as a mechanism which is nothing but a non-
cooperative game form. In implementation theory, unlike the many appli-
cations in game theory, a game is not given but is to be identified, that is,
rather than fixing a game and looking for the set of outcomes given by some
solution concept, we fix a set of outcomes and look for a game that yields
that set of outcomes as equilibria.
Another important point we should mention about implementation is the
revelation principle which demonstrates that if standard concepts of equilib-
rium are used (Nash equilibrium, weak dominance or Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium) it is always possible to define a mechanism for an implementable social
choice rule such that truthful revelation of preferences is an equilibrium of
this mechanism. Such mechanisms are called direct revelation mechanisms.
An example at this point would clarify what implementation theory deals
with. Consider a society that has to select a project among a set of projects.
Each member of the society has a preference ranking over the set of projects.
The society may have formed a certain normative goal which forms a social
choice rule defining the project to be selected as a function of the preference
profile of the society. In particular, the society may be unwilling to select a
project ranked lower than another project by all members of the society. (i.e.
a project which is Pareto dominated). The society may also wish to select
a Condorcet winner2 if it exists. Then the implementation problem would
be: “Does there exist a procedure where for every possible preference profile
of the society, the equilibrium outcome of the procedure would be Pareto
2An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it defeats any other alternative in a (pairwise)
majority voting election.
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efficient and Condorcet consistent?”
In order to render a positive answer to this question, one has to come up
with a mechanism whose equilibria coincide with outcomes identified by the
social choice rule for all possible preference profiles the agents may have. It
should be noted that by a mechanism we mean a game form which specifies a
set of possible actions to the members of the society and specifies the outcome
as a function of these actions.
One of the most important problems considered by implementation theory
is the full characterization of implementable social choice rules. That is to
say: “Can we identify properties that precisely identify the social choice rules
which are implementable and which are not implementable?”
As we have mentioned previously, the implementability of a social choice
rule depends on the game theoretic equilibrium concept employed. Imple-
mentation theory has considered several equilibrium concepts so far. If we
assume that the individuals behave in a non-cooperative manner, the equilib-
rium concept must be chosen among non-cooperative equilibrium concepts3.
An important point in modeling the non-cooperative mode of behavior of the
society is its information structure. If the information is incomplete, it is nat-
ural to restrict attention to weak dominance or Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
However, if we assume complete information, one of the most prominent
equilibrium concepts is Nash Equilibrium.
One of the main results regarding implementation in Nash equilibrium
3A cooperative equilibrium concept can also be used; see for example Dutta and Sen
(1991a) for strong Nash equilibrium, and Bernheim and Whinston (1987) for coalition
proof equilibrium
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is due to Maskin (1999).4 He has found out that a condition called “mono-
tonicity” is necessary for a social choice rule to be Nash-implementable and,
with at least three agents, monotonicity coupled with a condition called “no
veto power” is sufficient for Nash implementability5.
The monotonicity condition says that in case of a change in the preference
profile of the society, if in all agents’ preference orderings, a socially optimal
alternative does not fall below relative to any other alternative that it was not
below before, then it remains socially optimal. The no veto power property,
on the other hand, is a condition of near unanimity which says that if all but
one agent has the same alternative top ranked, then that alternative must
be socially optimal.
In this thesis, we prove the continuity of Maskin’s main results when pref-
erences of the society can all be represented by cardinal utility functions. The
restrictions we put on the domain of preferences are due to the essence of our
continuity measure; that is, the domain we consider is almost the most gen-
eral domain of preferences where this continuity measure for implementation
can be defined.
The continuity measure we define for Nash-implementability is due to
two new conditions we define, namely, epsilon-monotonicity and epsilon-
no veto power. These two conditions generalize the standard monotonicity
and no veto power conditions. We define an equilibrium concept which we
call epsilon-equilibrium and we prove that these two new conditions mimic
the properties of monotonicity and no veto power in Nash implementation
4Maskin’s article was circulated as a working paper in 1977.
5We will give a brief survey on Nash Implementation later in Chapter 3.
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for epsilon-equilibrium. That is, epsilon-monotonicity turns out to be a
necessity condition for epsilon-implementation (implementation in epsilon-
equilibrium), and epsilon-no veto power coupled with monotonicity is suffi-
cient for a social choice rule to be epsilon-implemented when there are at
least three agents in the society.
The results we obtained are important because they may be used to define
a distance notion for social choice rules in terms of Nash implementability.
This may lead us to a notion which, given the mechanism, measures the
sacrifice of a society when a non-Nash implementable social choice rule is
to be implemented. Finally, we must confess that the construction of an
appropriate example to present our results remains to be done.
The paper is organized as follows : Chapter 2 gives the definitions and the
notation used throughout this thesis. Chapter 3 provides a short survey on
Nash implementation. Chapter 4, introduces the preference domain we deal
with, and defines our continuity measure for implementation on this domain.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the paper.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter offers the basic definitions and the notations to be used later in
this thesis.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote a society with n agents where i ∈ N denotes
ith agent in the society and A denote the non-empty set of alternatives (or
outcomes) available to the society. (Note that A may be finite, denumerable
or uncountable.)
The set of all complete preorders on A is denoted by RA ( It is sometimes
called the unrestricted domain of preferences.) where an element Ri ∈
RA is called the preference ordering of agent i on A.1 (The set of all
strict preference orderings on A is denoted by PA 2). A preference profile
of the society is denoted by R = {R1, R2, ..., Rn} where Ri ∈ RA for all
i ∈ N . The set of all possible preference profiles of the society is denoted
1aRib means agent i weakly prefers a to b. (i.e a is at least as high as b in the ordering
Ri.
2A strict preference ordering is a negatively transitive and asymmetric binary relation.
i.e. It ranks no two alternatives as indifferent.
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by R = ∏i∈N Ri where Ri ⊆ RA is the set of all possible preference
orderings of agent i on A.
We start with the definition of a social choice rule.
Definition 1 A social choice rule (an SCR) F : R  A is a corre-
spondence from R into A, that is it selects a subset of A for each possible
preference profile of the society: F (R) ⊆ A for all R ∈ R. If an alternative
a ∈ A is chosen by the social choice rule F under a preference profile R ∈ R
i.e. a ∈ F (R), we say that a is F -optimal with respect to R.
As mentioned previously, a social choice rule is interpreted as selecting
the “welfare optimal” alternatives F (R) for each possible preference profile
R ∈ R of the society.3 Prominent examples of social choice rules include the
Pareto Rule, F PO = {a ∈ A| for all b ∈ A there exists i such that aRib}
which selects all Pareto Optimal alternatives given the preference profile R,
the Condorcet Rule, FCON = {a ∈ A| for all b ∈ A #{aRib} = #{aRib}},
where #{aRib} denotes the number of individuals who prefer a to b, and
it selects a (pairwise) majority voting winner for each profile R of strict
preferences, and in a pure exchange economy of l goods, where an alternative
means an allocation of goods across individuals (i.e. a = (a1, ..., an), where
ai ∈ Rl+), the Walrasian Rule FW which, given individuals’ endowments
(e1, ..., en), chooses the set of competitive equilibrium allocations.
3A social choice rule differs from a social welfare function of Arrow (1951) in that it
does not rank non-optimal alternatives. However, a social choice welfare function f induces
a natural social choice rule, that is the correspondence which selects the alternatives top-
ranked by f for each profile.
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We continue with the definition of a mechanism and the definition of
implementability of a social choice rule by a mechanism via an equilibrium
concept.
Definition 2 A (normal form) mechanism µ (or game form) is a pair
µ = (S = ×i∈NSi, g) where Si is the non-empty set denoting strategy space
for each agent i ∈ N and g : S → A is the outcome function. Note also
that (N,µ,R) defines a normal form game to be played by the society if the
preference profile of the society is R ∈ R
Definition 3 A social choice rule F : R  A is implementable by a
mechanism µ via the equilibrium concept Σ if
Σ(N,µ,R) = F (R) for all R ∈ R
The definitions below give some of the technical terms which are mostly
game theoretic and employed later in this thesis.
Definition 4 An n-person normal form game is Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉
where Si is a non-empty set of strategies of player i ∈ N , and ui : ×i∈NSi →
R is agent i’s utility or payoff function.
Definition 5 Let µ = (S, g) be a normal form mechanism. A strategy profile
s∗ ∈ ×i∈NSi is called a Nash Equilibrium of µ at R, if for all i ∈ N ,
and for all si ∈ Si
g(s∗)Rig(si, s∗−i).
Definition 6 Let µ = (S, g) be a normal form mechanism. A strategy si ∈ Si
is a dominant strategy for i in the game (N,µ,R) if
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g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) for all s
′
i ∈ Si and for all s−i ∈ ×j 6=iSj
A strategy profile s ∈ S is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game
(N,µ,R) if si is a dominant strategy for each i in the game (N,µ,R).
Definition 7 The lower contour set Li(a,R) of i at a ∈ A under R is
defined by
Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aRib}.
The strict lower contour set SLi(a,R) of i at a ∈ A under R is defined
by
SLi(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aPib}.
where Pi is the strict preference ordering induced by Ri.
Definition 8 A social choice rule F : R A is dictatorial if there exists
i ∈ N such that for all R ∈ R and a ∈ A, one has aRib for all b ∈ A implies
a ∈ F (R).
Definition 9 An outcome a ∈ A is Pareto optimal with respect to the
preference profile R ∈ R if there exists an outcome b such that bPia for some
i ∈ N then there exists i 6= j ∈ N such that aPjb. A social choice rule
F : R  A is said to be Pareto optimal if, for all R ∈ R and a ∈ F (R),
the outcome a is Pareto optimal with respect to R.
Definition 10 A function ui : A → R from the alternative set into real
numbers, represents the preference ordering Ri on A if; aRib if and
only if ui(a) ≥ ui(b) holds, for all a, b ∈ A. If there exists a function ui :
A→ R that represents a preference relation Ri on A then we say that Ri is





This chapter provides a brief survey on Nash Implementation.
Nash implementation was first studied by Groves and Ledyard (1977),
Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978), and Maskin (1999)1. However, the most gen-
eral results were obtained by Maskin. The following quotation from Jackson
(2001) explains the importance of his works:
The seminal work on Nash implementation, not only provides
us an understanding of what is Nash implementable, but it also
provides a blueprint for the techniques and approach that underlie
many of the general characterization results in the literature.
1Recall that; this article was circulated as a working paper as Maskin (1977) and
reprinted in 1999.
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We mentioned before that Maskin identified two conditions, namely mono-
tonicity and no veto power, where monotonicity turns out to be a necessary
condition for a social choice rule to be Nash implementable and, when there
are at least three agents in the society, monotonicity together with no veto
power suffice for a social choice rule to be Nash implementable.
Two other important works on Nash implementation are Moore and Re-
pullo (1990) and Danilov (1992). Moore and Repullo (1990) define a con-
dition, which is called condition µ, and which turns out to be a necessary
and sufficient condition for Nash implementability in case of three or more
agents. Although their condition closes the gap between Maskin’s necessity
and sufficiency conditions, to determine whether or not a social choice rule
satisfies this condition is difficult. Danilov (1992) gives an explicit formula
for the system of sets which condition µ of Moore and Repullo is based on
and he introduces the condition called essential monotonicity (a.k.a Danilov
monotonicity) which is also a necessary and sufficiency condition for Nash
implementability when there are at least three agents in the society. How-
ever, it should be noted that Moore and Repullo’s approach works in a more
general setting2.
Our work in this thesis is based on the seminal work of Maskin (1999).
Hence, in the next section, we will explore the conditions identified by Maskin
thoroughly and we will present the proofs of the necessity and sufficiency
theorems of Maskin (1999).
2For further information see Moore and Repullo (1990) and Danilov (1992)
Chapter 3. Implementation in Nash Equilibrium 13
3.2 Necessity and Sufficiency
We start with two equivalent definitions of “monotonicity”. The first one is
the original definition in Maskin (1999). We include the second one since it
is more commonly used in the literature.
Definition 11 3 A social choice rule F : R  A is monotonic if for all
a ∈ A,
∀R,R′ ∈ R if a ∈ F (R) and ∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ A, aRib⇒ aR′ib, then a ∈ F (R′).
Definition 12 A social choice rule F : R  A is monotonic if and only
if for all a ∈ A, for all R,R′ ∈ R the following is true:
if a ∈ F (R) and Li(a,R) ⊆ Li(a,R′) ∀i ∈ N, then a ∈ F (R′).
In other words, monotonicity calls for the social choice rule to satisfy the
following property: If an alternative is chosen under a given preference profile
by the social choice rule, then it must also be chosen when the preference
profile is altered so that none of the alternatives beaten by the original one
gets to be ranked higher than the original one in any of the agents’ preference
orderings; i.e. if the lower contour set of a socially optimal alternative does
not shrink for any agent, then this alternative must remain being socially
optimal. This seems to be an intuitive condition. It is also reasonable in
the sense that, it is satisfied by the prominent social choice rules mentioned
above, which are the Pareto Rule, F PO; the Condorcet Rule, FCON ; and
3Monotonicity condition was called as “strong positive association” by Muller and
Satterthwaite (1977).
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the Walrasian Rule, FW .4 To be more precise, let us give a small argument
which explains why the Pareto Rule satisfies monotonicity. Let a ∈ A be a
Pareto optimal alternative with respect to preference profile R, hence chosen
by the Pareto Rule under R. This means for any other alternative b ∈ N ,
there exists an agent i∗ ∈ N such that,aRi∗b. If we replace the preference
profile R with R′ such that for all i ∈ N , aRib implies aR′ib, then aR′i∗b
holds, therefore a is Pareto optimal with respect to R′ as well, and hence it
is chosen under R′ by the Pareto Rule, F PO.
On the other hand, some well-known social choice rules do not satisfy
monotonicity. For example, the Borda Count Rule, FBC , (i.e rank-order
voting) fails to satisfy monotonicity. The Borda Count Rule works as follows:
each individual assigns points to every alternative in the alternative set A
so that the best alternative of each player get #A points, the second best of
each individual gets #A− 1 points, and so on. The alternatives who get the
highest points in total are chosen by the Borda Count Rule. Now, to see why
the Borda Count Rule fails to satisfy monotonicity, consider the following
example:




4The Walrasian Rule is not monotonic in general but it is monotonic on a domain of
preferences such that all competitive equilibria occur in the interior of the feasible set, see
Hurwicz and E. Maskin (1995) for more detail.
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Here, a gets 6 points and it is the only alternative chosen by FBC. Now,
consider the following preference profile R′ defined as follows;
• aR1cR1bR1d;
• cR2dR2aR2b;
Note that, aRib implies aR
′
ib but now c is the only alternative chosen by F
BC.
This is a violation to monotonicity.
One may have doubts for the monotonicity condition, but as the theorem
we will present after defining Nash implementability suggests, for a social
choice rule to be Nash Implementable monotonicity is inescapable.
Definition 13 A social choice rule F : R A is implementable in Nash
Equilibrium if there exists a mechanism µ = (S, g) such that:
1. For every R ∈ R and for every a ∈ F (R) there exists s∗ ∈ S such that
s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of µ at R and g(s∗) = a.
2. For every R ∈ R and for every b /∈ F (R), there does not exist s∗ ∈ S
such that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of µ at R and g(s∗) = b.
Requirement (1) in the definition of Nash implementability of a social
choice rule F means that, there is a Nash equilibrium of µ corresponding to
each F -optimal alternative. On the other hand requirement (2) means, every
Nash equilibrium of µ is F -optimal.5. Together they imply that if F is Nash
implementable by a mechanism µ then Nash equilibria of µ and F -optimal
alternatives coincide.
5This is the contrapositive of what is stated in requirement (2) in the definition of Nash
implementability.
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Theorem 1 If a social choice rule F : R  A is implementable in Nash
Equilibrium then it is monotonic.
Proof. The proof here is a modified version of the proof in Maskin (1999)
Let F : R A be a Nash implementable social choice rule. Take R,R′ ∈ R
such that a ∈ F (R) and assume aRib implies aR′ib for all i inN and for all
b ∈ A
Since F is implementable via Nash Equilibrium, there exists a mechanism
µ = (S, g) such that g : S → A where there exists s ∈ S with g(s) = a and
g(s)Rig(si, s−i) for all s′i ∈ Si for all i ∈ N .
By assumption, this implies g(s)R′ig(si, s−i) for all s
′
i ∈ Si for all i ∈ N
which means s is a Nash Equilibrium with respect to R′ and hence g(s) ∈
F (R′) i.e a ∈ F (R′). Therefore F is monotonic.
Monotonicity in terms of Nash implementability can be interpreted in two
ways. The first is: if an alternative is to be implemented at one profile but not
another, then it must have fallen in someone’s rankings in order to break the
Nash equilibrium via some deviation. Whereas the second interpretation is:
if an alternative is implemented at one profile and rises in each individual’s
rankings at another preference profile, then the strategy profile leading to
the alternative which forms a Nash equilibrium at the first profile must still
be a Nash equilibrium profile at the second profile. These conditions are
equivalent since they are the contra-positive of each other. Both of these
interpretations are important. The first implies that there must exist some
preference reversal if an equilibrium at one profile is broken at another. The
second emphasizes that if the ranking of an equilibrium alternative improves
for each agent then it must remain an equilibrium outcome, which is often
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used for checking if monotonicity is satisfied.
We continue with the sufficiency conditions for Nash implementation; we
restrict ourselves to the case, where there are at least three agents6.
The example below which is due to Maskin (1985) indicates that mono-
tonicity itself is not sufficient for a social choice rule to be Nash imple-
mentable.
Example 2 A monotonic social choice rule which is not Nash im-
plementable:
Let n = 3, A = {a, b, c}, R = PA × PA × PA. Consider the social choice
rule F : R  A such that, for any R ∈ R and x, y ∈ A the following holds:
x ∈ F (R) if and only if
x is Pareto optimal,
if x ∈ a, b and xP1y for all y 6= x;
if x = c then there exists y ∈ A such that xP1y.
It is clear that F is monotonic. Assume, F is Nash implementable by a
mechanism µ = (S, g). Now consider the following profiles P, P ′, P ′′ ∈ R
such that;
• bP1cP1a; cP2aP2b; cP3aP3b
F (P ) = {b, c}
• aP ′1bP ′1c; cP ′2bP ′2a; cP ′3aP ′3b
F (P ′) = {a}
• bP ′′1 aP ′′1 c; aP ′′2 bP ′′2 c; aP ′′3 bP ′′3 c
F (P ′′) = {b}
6We will give a short discussion for the case of two agents later.
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Since µ Nash implements F , there exists s ∈ S such that s is a Nash
equilibrium under P and g(s) = c. Because bP1c, there does not exist s
′
1 ∈ S1
such that g(s′1, s−1) = b. Moreover, there does not exist s
′
1 ∈ S such that
g(s′1, s−1) = a because if exists, then (s
′
1, s−1) would be a Nash equilibrium
under P ′′ with g(s′1, s−1) = a contradicting F (P
′′) = b, but this implies s is a
Nash equilibrium under P ′ with g(s) = c contradicting F (P ′) = a. Therefore,
F is not Nash implementable.
As the above example shows, monotonicity is not sufficient for a social
choice rule to be Nash implementable. Thus we need additional conditions.
Below we will define a new condition called “no veto power”, and then, we
will prove that monotonicity together with no veto power is sufficient for
a social choice rule to be Nash implemented when there are at least three
agents in the society.
Definition 14 A social choice rule is said to satisfy the no veto power
(NVP) property if there exists a player j ∈ N such that for all the other
players i 6= j, and for all b ∈ A, aRib implies a ∈ F (R).
No veto power is a near unanimity condition as mentioned before; it
basically says that if all but one agent rank an alternative as first (i.e. as
one of their best alternatives), then that alternative must be optimal for the
society; hence it must be chosen by the social choice rule.
Now, we present the sufficiency theorem for Nash implementability when
there are at least three agents in the society.
Theorem 2 Let n ≥ 3, if a social choice rule F : R A is monotonic and
satisfies no veto power then F is Nash implementable.
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Proof. 7 The proof here is a modified version of Repullo (1987) and
will be used as a blue print for the sufficiency proof in Chapter 4. We will
construct a game form which implements F in Nash Equilibrium8. For each
player i ∈ N define the strategy space
Si = R× A× N
That is, each agent i ∈ N announces a triple consisting of a preference profile
Ri ∈ R for the society (not necessarily the true one), an alternative ai ∈ A
and a natural number m ∈ N (the numbers are for breaking the ties). Define
the outcome function g : S → A as follows:
(i) If si = (R, a,m) for all i ∈ N and a ∈ F (R), then g(s) = a.
That is if players are unanimous in their strategy, and their proposed
alternative is F -optimal with respect to the proposed preference profile
R, the outcome is a.
(ii) If there exists a player j ∈ N such that for all the other players i 6= j
si = (R, a,m) and sj = (R
j, aj,mj) and a ∈ F (R) then g(s) = aj if
aj ∈ L(a,Ri), and g(s) = a otherwise.
In other words, if all the players but one play the same strategy, and
their proposed alternative a is F -optimal with respect to their proposed
7This theorem has been proved by Williams (1986) with stronger assumptions than in
Maskin (1999), also Repullo (1987), Saijo (1988) and McKelvey (1989) have proved this
sufficiency theorem for Nash implementability.
8Here, we construct a mechanism whose all pure strategy Nash equilibria satisfy (1)
and (2) in the definition of Nash implementation, but the construction can be extended
to handle mixed strategies. See Maskin (1999) for details.
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profile R, the odd-man-out gets his proposed alternative only if it is in
the lower contour set of a under the preference ordering that the other
players propose for him; otherwise outcome is a.
(iii) If neither (i) nor (ii) applies, then g(s) = ak where k = max{j|j ∈
argmaxi∈N m
i}.
That is, when neither (i) nor (ii) applies, the outcome is the alterna-
tive proposed by the player with the highest index among those whose
proposed number is maximal.
It remains to show that the mechanism defined above implements any
F , which satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, in Nash equilibrium. To
make the proof more understandable, we divide it into claims.
Claim 1 For all R ∈ R and all a ∈ A, if a ∈ F (R), for any m ∈ N
s = (s1, ..., sn) such that si = (R, a,m) for all i ∈ N , constitutes a Nash
equilibrium with respect to R. i.e for all i ∈ N , (g(s))Ri(g(s′i, s−i)), for all
s′i ∈ Si.
Proof. To understand why, consider a unilateral deviation of agent j.
Then (ii) applies. Thus, this will lead to either no change in outcome or it
will change the outcome to aj. In the former, g(s) = a and the claim trivially
holds. The latter case is possible only if aj ∈ L(a,Ri), which is worse for
agent j. Therefore, player j does not have any incetive to deviate.i.e for
all i ∈ N , (g(s))Ri(g(s′i, s−i)), for all s′i ∈ Si holds and hence, s is a Nash
equilibrium with respect to R.
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With this claim, we established the requirement (1) –that there is a Nash
equilibrium of µ corresponding to each F optimal alternative– of Nash imple-
mentability. To establish the requirement (2) –that every Nash equilibrium
of µ is F optimal–we propose the second claim below.
Claim 2 Let s ∈ S be a Nash equilibrium of µ with respect to real preference
profile R∗ of the society. Then g(s) ∈ F (R∗).
Proof. We will divide the proof into subcases:
Case 1: Assume si 6= sj for some i, j ∈ N then either (ii) or (iii)
applies. However, in both cases, it is possible for n− 1 agents to obtain any
alternative in A by a unilateral deviation. (To do so, they should just increase
their proposed natural number to a higher number than the current proposed
highest number.) But since s is a Nash Equilibrium then, g(s)R∗g(s′i, s−i)
for all i ∈ N , and for all s′i ∈ Si. Hence, it must be that there is j ∈ N such
that for all j 6= i g(s)R∗b for all b ∈ A. Hence, by no veto power property
g(s) ∈ F (R∗).
Case 2:Assume si = (R, a,m) for all i ∈ N . Now we have additional
subcases:
Subcase 1: If a /∈ F (R) then (iii) applies and as above g(s) ∈ F (R∗).
Subcase 2: If a ∈ F (R) then g(s) = a by (i). Now we need to show
that a ∈ F (R∗). In this case, we have for all i ∈ N and for all b ∈ A
with aRib implies aR
∗
i b. To see why, assume it does not hold, i.e for some
i ∈ N and some b ∈ A aRib holds but aR∗i b) does not hold. Then, by
(ii) agent i can change the outcome to b by just changing his strategy to
s′i = (R
∗, b, ri). But this means g(s′i, s−i)R
∗g(s) This is a contradiction of
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s being Nash equilibrium with respect to R∗. Thus, aRib implies aR∗i b and
since F is monotonic; this implies a ∈ F (R∗) i.e g(s) ∈ F (R∗).
Hence, we established requirement (2) in the definition of Nash imple-
mentability as well. By Claim 1 and Claim 2 we conclude that any monotonic
social choice rule which satisfy no veto power condition, is implementable in
Nash equilibrium when there are at least three agents in the society.
In the proof above, a very abstract mechanism is used. Nevertheless, its
complexity derives from its generality. One can think this theorem as a kind
of existence theorem for the implementation in Nash equilibrium. Practical
mechanisms to be used in real world examples are another subject to be
considered after these kind of characterization theorems.
A point we should mention before ending this chapter is the case where
there are 2 agents in the society. This may seem awkward to the reader, a
society with two agents only, but it is of obvious importance since there are
many bilateral interactions that one would want the theory to explain. It is
interesting that there are non-trivial differences between the case of n = 2
and n 5 3. Note that the no veto power condition is vague in case of n = 2. A
sufficient condition called “non-empty lower intersection condition” appears
in Dutta and Sen (1991b).Interested reader can find the characterization for





In this chapter, we will consider a continuity measure on implementability of
social choice rules on a restricted domain of preferences. We restrict ourselves
to a domain where each preference ordering can be represented by a cardi-
nal utility function. The continuity measure we will consider, will employ
those cardinal utilities in order to approximate payoffs for both equilibrium
considerations and monotonicity and no veto power properties.
4.2 The Domain
For a special class of preferences, it is possible to use utility functions to
denote the preference orderings of agents in the society, similarly the prefer-
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ence profile of the society can be identified by the use of the utility functions
for those special class of preferences. (Recall: Debreu’s representation theo-
rem1.)
We restrict ourselves to the domain of preferences where preference or-
derings of the agents are representable by cardinal utility functions on the
non-empty compact alternative set A. That is, we consider a society N =
{1, ...., n} where every individual i ∈ N has a cardinal utility function ui :
A→ R representing his/her preference orderings on the compact alternative
set A. Hence the preference profile of the society is represented by a vec-
tor of functions u = {u1, ..., un}. An example would be preferences that are
represented by von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions.
Let UA represent the set of all cardinal utility functions on A. For every
agent i ∈ N , let Ui ⊆ UA be the set of all possible utility functions denoting
agent i’s possible preferences. Then, the set of all possible utility profiles of
the society is represented by U = ×i∈NUi.
Now, we give the definition of a social choice rule on the domain we
restrict our attention. Note that, this definition presents nothing new, it is
just the restriction of the canonical definition to our domain.
Definition 15 A social choice rule F : U  A is a correspondence, which
selects a feasible subset F (u) ⊆ A for all possible utility profile u ∈ U of the
1Debreu’s representation theorem basically says that, any continuous complete preorder
on an arbitrary set is representable by a continuous utility function, in fact it is possible
to narrow down the assumptions of this theorem, for any arbitrary set and a complete
preorder R on this set, there exists a utility function representing R if and only if there
exist a subset of this arbitrary set which is countable and R-order-dense. See Debreu
(1959), Kreps (1988), and Fishburn (1970) for more details.
Chapter 4. Continuity of Maskin’s Implementation Result 25
society.
4.3 The continuity measure
4.3.1 Equilibrium Concept
We start with the equilibrium concept, for which we will characterize the
implementable social choice rules on our domain. Let us first define what
epsilon-equilibrium of a mechanism µ means:
Definition 16 Let µ = (S, g) be a normal form mechanism. A strategy
profile s∗ ∈ ×i∈NSi is called an epsilon-equilibrium of µ at u, if, given
any ε ∈ R, for all i ∈ N , and for all si ∈ Si
ui(g(s
∗)) = ui(g(si, s∗−i))− ε.
Note that, ε in the definition of epsilon-equilibrium is allowed to be a
negative real number. The notion of epsilon-equilibrium is aimed to general-
ize the notion of Nash equilibrium where during game play an agent requires
a payoff at least as much as ε to deviate from an outcome. That is exactly
why we restrict attention to cardinal utility functions because otherwise the
particular value of ε does not have any meaning.
According to the particular values of ε ∈ R we can interpret the epsilon-
equilibrium in three phases: If ε > 0 epsilon-equilibrium is equivalent to
the epsilon-Nash equilibrium introduced by Radner (1980), it coincides with
Nash equilibrium when ε = 0 and when ε < 0 it prescribes another equilib-
rium concept, which we will refer to it as epsilon-strict Nash equilibrium.
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Another important point is that; these three phases of ε, define a subset-
superset relation between epsilon-equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium; that
is, when ε > 0 epsilon-equilibrium is a superset of Nash equilibrium, when
ε = 0 epsilon-equilibrium is exactly equivalent to Nash equilibrium, and
when ε < 0 epsilon-equilibrium is a refinement, that is a subset of Nash
equilibrium2.
We continue with the definition of implementability of a social choice rule
in epsilon-equilibrium.
Definition 17 (ε-implementability) Let ε ∈ R. A social choice rule F :
U  A is ε-implementable if there exists a mechanism µ = (S, g) such
that the following conditions hold:
1. For all u ∈ U , and for all a ∈ F (u), there exists s ∈ S such that
g(s) = a and for all i ∈ N
ui(g(s)) > ui(g(s′i, s−i))− ε, for all s′i ∈ Si,
and;
2. For any s ∈ S which satisfies, for all i ∈ N
ui(g(s)) > ui(g(s′i, s−i))− ε, for all s′i ∈ Si,
g(s) must be in F (u).
Requirement (1) in the definition of epsilon-Nash implementability of a
social choice rule F says that, there is an epsilon-equilibrium of µ correspond-
ing to each F -optimal alternative. On the other hand requirement (2) says,
2Note that; when ε < 0, the set of epsilon equilibria of a game can be empty. An
example is zero-sum games.
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every epsilon-equilibrium of µ is F -optimal. Together, they imply that if F is
epsilon-implementable by a mechanism µ then the epsilon-equilibria of µ and
F -optimal alternatives coincide as in the case of the Nash implementation.3
When the utility profile and the game form to be used are fixed, the size
of ε may be useful to compare two social choice rules in terms of imple-
mentability. Obviously, 0-Nash Implementability coincides with Nash imple-
mentability. In the next section below, we continue with the necessity and
sufficiency conditions for epsilon-implementability.
4.3.2 Epsilon-Monotonicity
We start with the definition of epsilon-monotonicity, which will be turned
out to be a necessary condition for epsilon-implementability.
Definition 18 (ε-Monotonicity) Let ε ∈ R. A social choice rule F : U 
A is ε-monotonic if for all u, u′ ∈ U , and for all a ∈ F (u), the following
is true:
for all b ∈ A such that ui(a) ≥ ui(b)− ε implies u′i(a) ≥ u′i(b)− ε
implies a ∈ F (u′).
The notion of ε-monotonicity is aimed to generalize Maskin monotonicity,
with which it coincides when ε is set to equal 0. In words it tells us that if
a is chosen when the preference profile is given by u, then a must also be
chosen with the preference profile altered to u′ such that under u′ none of
3Note that, we restrict ourselves to pure strategies only.
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the alternatives that have a utility figure lower than ui(a)+ε receive a utility
figure higher than u′i(a) + ε.
Indeed, for each ε > 0, the notion of ε-monotonicity is stronger than
monotonicity. To observe this, note that given a utility profile u ∈ U , if
ε > 0 is chosen sufficiently high, e.g. ε > maxa,b∈A,i∈N |ui(a) − ui(b)|, only
constant social choice rules satisfy ε-monotonicity condition. On the other
hand, for each ε < 0, the notion of ε-monotonicity is also stronger than
monotonicity condition since, if ε < 0 is chosen sufficiently small, e.g. ε <
−maxa,b∈A,i∈N |ui(a) − ui(b)|, again only constant social choice rules satisfy
ε-monotonicity condition.
Now, we present the necessity theorem for epsilon-implementation which
states that epsilon-Monotonicity is inescapable for epsilon-implementability.
Theorem 3 Let ε ∈ R. If a social choice rule F : U  A is ε-implementable,
then it is ε-monotonic.
Proof. Let F : U  A be ε-implementable by the mechanism µ = (S, g).
Consider two utility profiles u, u′ ∈ U with for all b ∈ A such that ui(a) ≥
ui(b)− ε implies u′i(a) ≥ u′i(b)− ε for all i ∈ N . Let a ∈ F (u) What we need
to show is a ∈ F (u′).
Since F is implementable by µ = (S, g) in epsilon-equilibrium, there exists
s ∈ S such that g(s) = a where ui(g(s)) ≥ ui(g(s′i, s−i))−ε, for all i ∈ N , for
all s′i ∈ Si. Then by assumption u′i(g(s)) ≥ u′i(g(s′i, s−i)) − ε for all s′i ∈ Si,
for all i ∈ N but this means s satisfies the condition of (2) in the definition
of ε-implementability, then by (2) g(s) ∈ F (u′) i.e. a ∈ F (u′) therefore F is
ε-monotonic.
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4.3.3 Epsilon-No Veto Power
We continue with the definition of another condition called epsilon-no-veto
power which is a variant of no veto power condition and which will be turned
out to be a sufficient condition for epsilon-implementability when combined
with epsilon-monotonicity.
Definition 19 (ε-NVP) Let ε ∈ R. A social choice rule is said to satisfy
ε-no veto power condition if there exists a player j ∈ N such that for all
the other players i 6= j, and for all b ∈ A, ui(a) ≥ ui(b)−ε implies a ∈ F (u).
The ε-no veto power condition is a generalization of the standard no veto
power condition to which this new notion equals when ε = 0. In words, ε-no
veto power condition can be interpreted in two different ways according to
the particular value of ε: When ε > 0, it implies that, if all the players but
one were to think that an alternative provides a return figure that is not less
than ε from the utility level of their highest ranked alternative, then it must
be chosen. On the other hand, when ε < 0 it basically says that if there
exists an alternative which provides a return figure which is more than | ε |
from the utility level of all the other alternatives for all but one player, then
it must be chosen.
When ε > 0 is sufficiently high, e.g. ε > maxa,b∈A,i∈N |ui(a) − ui(b)|, we
point out that no social choice rule but only the one which chooses A, i.e
identity correspondence satisfy ε-no veto power property. When ε < 0 ε-no
veto power property is weaker than the no veto power property. To see this
consider ε¯ < −maxa,b∈A,i∈N |ui(a) − ui(b)|. Then, the restriction put in the
definition of ε-no veto power will not bind, hence, any social choice rule will
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be ε¯-NVP.
We, now present the sufficiency theorem for epsilon-implementation which
basically says that epsilon-monotonicity coupled with epsilon-no veto power
turns out to be sufficient for epsilon-Nash implementation where there are
at least three agents in the society.
Theorem 4 (#N ≥ 3)Let ε ∈ R. If a social choice rule F : U  A satisfies
ε-monotonicity and ε-no veto power, then it is ε-implementable.
Proof. The proof is by construction, we will construct a mechanism
µ = (S, g) which implements F in epsilon-Nash equilibrium. Consider the
mechanism µ = (S, g) such that g : S → A is the outcome function and
the strategy spaces are defined as Si = (U,A, (0, 1)) for all i ∈ N . That is,
every agent proposes a utility profile for the society, an alternative and a real
number in the open interval (0,1). The outcome function g is given by the
following:
(i) If si = (u, a, r) for all i ∈ N and a ∈ F (u), then g(s) = a.
(ii) If there exists a player j ∈ N such that for all the other players i 6= j
si = (u, a, r) and sj = (u
j, aj, rj) and a ∈ F (u) then g(s) = aj if
uj(a) ≥ uj(aj)− ε, and g(s) = a otherwise.
(iii) If neither (i) nor (ii) applies, then g(s) = ak where k ∈ argmaxi(ri).
Now the rest of the proof is to show that the mechanism µ = (S, g) defined
above ε-implements F .
Claim 3 For all u ∈ U and a ∈ A, si = (u, a, 1/2) for all i ∈ N , is an
ε-equilibrium, i.e for all i ∈ N , ui(g(s)) ≥ ui(g(s′i, s−i))− ε, for all s′i ∈ Si.
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Proof. To understand why consider a unilateral deviation of agent j.
Then (ii) applies. So, this will lead to either no changes in outcome or
it will change the outcome to aj. In the former, g(s) = a and the claim
trivially holds. The latter case is possible only if uj(a) > uj(aj) − ε i.e
uj(g(s)) > uj(g(s′j, s−j))−ε. Therefore, player j does not have any deviation
opportunities. Hence, (1) in the definition of ε-implementability holds.
Claim 4 Consider any ε-equilibrium s ∈ S with respect to the real utility
profile u∗ of the society. Then g(s) ∈ F (u∗).
Proof. We will work with subcases:
Case 1:si 6= sj for some i, j ∈ N . Then either (ii) or (iii) applies. But
in both cases, it is possible for n− 1 agents to get any alternative in A by a
unilateral deviation. (To do so, they should just increase their proposed real
number to a higher number than the current proposed highest number.) But
since s is an ε-equilibrium then, u∗i (g(s)) ≥ u∗i (g(s′i, s−i)) − ε, for all i ∈ N
for all s′i ∈ Si. Hence, it must be that there exists j ∈ N such that for all
j 6= i u∗i (g(s)) ≥ u∗i (b)− ε for all b ∈ A. Hence, by ε-no veto power condition
g(s) ∈ F (u∗).
Case 2: si = (u, a, r) for all i ∈ N . Now we have additional subcases:
Subcase 1: a /∈ F (u). Then (iii) applies and as above g(s) ∈ F (u′).
Subcase 2: a ∈ F (u). Then g(s) = a by (i). Now we need to show that
a ∈ F (u∗). In this case we have for all i ∈ N and for all b ∈ A with ui(a) ≥
ui(b)−ε implies u∗i (a) ≥ u∗i (b)−ε. To see why assume not, i.e for some i ∈ N
and some b ∈ A ui(a) ≥ ui(b)− ε holds but u∗i (a) < u∗i (b)− ε. Then, agent i
can change the outcome to b by just changing his strategy to s′i = (u
i, b, ri)
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i), s−i) − ε This is a contradiction of s
being an ε-equilibrium. Thus, by ε-monotonicity, a ∈ F (u∗) i.e g(s) ∈ F (u′).
Hence the requirement (2) in the definition of epsilon-implementability is
satisfied.
By the two claims above we established both requirement (1) and (2) in
the definition of epsilon-implementability. Therefore, every social choice rule




In this thesis, we briefly surveyed Nash implementation and after concen-
trating on a restricted domain of cardinal preferences we defined a continuity
measure by using an equilibrium concept, which we call epsilon-equilibrium.
Although, we characterized the implementable social choice rules in epsilon-
equilibrium, we have not yet discovered a relevant example on our domain
to examine the regularities of our conditions.
We believe that, our characterization of epsilon-implementation may lead
us to a distance notion for social choice rules in terms of implementabil-
ity in Nash equilibrium. In turn, one may use these to construct a notion
which in some sense measures the sacrifice of a society when a non-Nash
implementable social choice rule is to be implemented.
Finally, the analysis of some of the prominent social choice rules and
some other intuitive examples of social choice rules on our domain obviously
constitute a future avenue for research.
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